Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

leona M. Nelson Martin v. George L. Nelson Jr. :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gayle Dean Hunt and Mikel M. Boley; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Ryberg, McCoy and Halgren, Leon A. Halgren; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Martin v. Nelson, No. 13805.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/965

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

LAW LIBRARY
DEC 6

1975

BRIG'IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

R

IN THE SUPREMfl- t*©WErt"Sch°o1
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEONA M. NELSON MARTIN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, I
vs.
)

^
No.
13805

GEORGE L. NELSON, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
GAYLE DEAN HUNT AND
MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
915 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RYBERG, McCOY & HALGREN | T J
|
Leon A. Halgren,
g
|
I
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
,-„
—.
CB }
325 South Third East
..
'"
® '9?5
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111" cj.T?

£D

PRINTED BY SERVICE PRESS, INC.

- 16 W. 7TH S O . , SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - 363-9B41

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
- •"
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Page
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WERE
FULLY AND ADEQUATELY PROTECTED
' ' BELOW AND THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

2

A. As between the parties to a lawsuit and their
privies, the process server's return is coni»•

elusive in the absence of fraud and cannot be
rebutted by extrinsic evidence
2
B. Defendant-Appellant has failed to present ... "
sufficient evidence to rebut the truthfulness of
the process server's return
5

^

C. No substantial prejudice was caused to
Defendant-Appellant by the proceedings below

6

D. Defendant-Appellant waived his right to contest the alleged defects in service

8

POINT II.
THE SUMMONS WAS NOT DEFECTIVE NOR
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 78-27-27, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953)

9

CONCLUSION
,

,

..

11
CASES C I T E D

Clark v. Bradstreet
104 A.2d 739 (N.H. 1954)
Childress v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
194 Va. 191 (1952)

2, 3
3

l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED—(continued)
pa

Hollinger v. Hollinger
416 Pa. 473, 206 A.2d 1 (1965)

8e

3, 5, 6

Haley v. Hershberger
207 Kan. 459, 485 R2d 1321 (1971)

4

Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co.
400 P.2d 892 (Mont. 1965)

~-~ 5

Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert
16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965)

6, 7

Rees v. Scott
8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877 (1958)

8

Krueger v. Lynch
242 Iowa 772, 48 N.W.2d 266 (1951)

10

State ex rel. Kalich v. Bryson
253 Or. 418, 453 P.2d 659 (1969)

10, 11

STATUTES CITED

Utah R. Civ. P. 1

1

7

78-27-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

9

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES CITED

62 Am. Jur. 2d "Process" (1972)

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8, 9

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEONA M. NELSON MARTIN,
Plaintiff and
"'•'

Respondent,
Case
No.
13805

vs.

GEORGE L. NELSON, JR.,
Defendant and

Appellant.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 12, 1971, Plaintiff-Respondent filed an
action in the District Court of Salt Lake County to
renew judgments previously granted against Defendant-Appellant for back child support. On August 27,
1971, Defendant-Appellant was personally served
with summons and complaint by Mr. Gordon M.
Keenoy, Deputy Sheriff of Los Angeles, County, Cali1
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fornia. Defendant-Appellant does not deny in Ms
brief nor did he deny below this personal service of
process or that he was fully informed of the nature
of the proceedings filed against him. However, no
answer to Plaintiff-Respondent's complaint was ever
filed by Defendant-Appellant. On November 9, 1973,
a default judgment was taken against DefendantAppellant, after which time Defendant-Appellant's
counsel made a special appearance before the lower
court seeking to vacate the judgment. The basis for
this special appearance contesting the judgment was
that the court was without jurisdiction. The District
Court denied Appellant's motion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WERE
FULLY AND ADEQUATELY PROTECTED
BELOW AND THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
A. As between the parties to a lawsuit and their
privies, the process server's return is conclusive in
the absence of fraud and cannot he rebutted by
extrinsic evidence.
The previous statement represents the majority
position of state tribunals throughout the United
States. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated
in Clarke Rradstmet, 104 A.2d 739 (N.H. 195*1,

2
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[ l i t has long been the law in New Hamshire that between the parties to a suit and
those claiming under them the return of the
sheriff of matters material to be returned is
so far conclusive evidence that it cannot be
contradicted for the purpose of invalidating
the sheriffs proceeding or defeating any right
acquired under them. Ibid, at 741 of A.2d.
In an action to subject certain real property conveyed to defendant's spouse to plaintiffs judgment,
the highest tribunal of Virginia similarly held.
The Court stated, "The sheriffs return disclosed
that this motion for judgment was served upon
the [Defendants] personally. . . . No fraud or
collusion being involved, Defendants concede that the
return imports a verity and thus cannot be assailed/'
Childress v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 194
Va. 191 (1952). As Defendant-Appellant points out
in his brief, the notarized return of Keenoy purports
to satisfy all of the statutory requisites. DefendantAppellant does not allege any fraud or collusion on
the part of Keenoy or Plaintiff-Respondent.
Hollinger v. Hollinger, 416 Pa. 473, 206 A.2d 1
(1965), involved an automobile accident case in
which the defendant claimed improper service. In
its dicta the court stated the general rule concerning
the conclusiveness of a process server's return. It
stated, "Clin the absence of fraud, the return of
service of a sheriff, which is full and complete on its
%
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face, is conclusive and immune from attack by
extrinsic evidence." Ibid, at 475.
In 1971, the Kansas Supreme Court had before
it a situation not unlike the present. There the
defendant-appellant waited until after judgment to
attack the veracity of the process server's return. The
court conceded that the appellant might have been
able to rebut the return prior to judgment. However,
the Court went on to hold, "The general rule [is]
that a sheriff's return of summons may not be impeached by oral testimony after judgment as to
matters therein recited, which were clearly within
the sheriff's personal knowledge. . . ." Haley v.
Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 485 P.2d 1321 (1971).
(Emphasis added) The Defendant-Appellant does
not maintain that any of the return's alleged defects
were not within the personal knowledge of Keenoy.
This general rule as stated in Haley, supra, is especially applicable to a situation like the present where
the defendant is personally served with process, is
properly put on notice of the plaintiff's claims, and
merely waits for over two full years before choosing
to do anything. Thus, even if this court were to
adopt the more liberal view as espoused in DefendantAppellant's brief, a Defendant should not be allowed
to wait until after the entry of judgment to contend
that the lower Court was without jurisdiction. The
present situation is a far cry from the cases cited in
Defendant-Appellant's brief where the chances of sub-
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stantial injustice were very real if a strict adherence
to the majority position were applied. This will be
more fully discussed below.
B. Defendant-Appellant has failed to present
sufficient evidence to rebut the truthfulness of the
process server's return.
A 1965 decision of the Montana Supreme Court
clearly sets forth the standard for rebuttal of returns.
The Court stated that in order to rebut the truthfulness of the return requires "more than a little proof,
it must be clear, unequivocal and convincing."
Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co., 400 P.2d 892, 894. In
the present situation the only proof of improper service comes in the form of an affidavit of the DefendantAppellant and from a copy of the complaint, which
Appellant claims to be the one left with him on
August 27, 1971. On the other hand the process
server's return, which was sworn to only five days
after service was made, states that all of the proper
information was placed upon the copy of the complaint left with the Defendant-Appellant. Due to
the lapse of time, it would have been an effort in
futility for Plaintiff-Respondent to attempt to have
a more current affidavit prepared for officer Keenoy.
The lower court was, thus, faced with choosing
between two conflicting affidavits, one made five
days after service and one sworn to two years later.
The Pennsylvania Court in Hollinger, supra, although
#
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adopting the conclusive rule, made a statement which
applies regardless of the standard. It stated:
[There is] a presumption that a sheriff,
acting in the course of his official duties, acts
with proprietjr and, therefore, when the sheriff
in the course of such official duties makes a
statement, by way of an official return, such
statement is given conclusive effect. Hollingery
supra, at 475.
In addition, there was one very critical factor
which must have been considered by the lower court.
If the facts were as Appellant has contended, then
why would he wait two full years to contest the
service of process? Would it not have been more
prudent for Defendant-Appellant to strike at the
allegedly defective service at the first possible
moment? With all of these various factors to consider
the lower court had ample basis for holding as it did.
The Defendant-Appellant failed to carry its heavy
burden of overcoming the presumption of veracity
of the process server's return.
;

C. No Substantial Prejudice was caused to Defendant-Appellant by the Proceedings Below.
{<

'Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert,
16 Utah M 407, 402 P.2 703 (1965), is cited in
Defendant-Appellant's brief as standing for the
proposition that the formalities of proper service must

6
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be strictly followed. However, a closer look at that
decision indicates otherwise. The Court started out
with the following basic premise: "It is true that our
new rules of civil procedure were intended to eliminate undue emphasis on technicalities and to provide
liberality in procedure to the end that disputes be
heard and determined on their merits." Ibid, at 704
of P.2d. This statement is in accord with Rule 1 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads in
part, 4i They [the Rules] shall be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." The Court in Tolbert,
supra, went on to state, "Liberality in their interpretation and application should be indulged where no
prejudice or disadvantage to anyone results. . . ."
Defendant-Appellant was not misled as was the
Defendant in Tolbert, supra. The DefendantAppellant here was personally served with summons
and complaint, had the opportunity to know of the
allegations being made against him, knew the court
in which the action was being prosecuted, and had
over two full years to file his answer putting the
matter at issue. There was no substantia] prejudice
or disadvantage to Defendant-Appellant. Therefore,
even if the facts of service were as Defendant-Appellant alleges, he should not be allowed to attack the
jurisdiction of the lower court after judgment. The
only substantial prejudice that would result from
such a ruling would be to Plaintiff-Respondent due
7:
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to the running of the statute of limitations against
most of the judgments for child support alleged in
Plaintiff-Respondent's complaint.
.w
' D. Defendant-Appellant waived his right to contest the alleged defects in service.
Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877, cited
in Defendant-Appellant's brief, held that the failure
of a deputy sheriff to date the copy of a ten-day
summons left with the defendant was fatally defective. However, a simple application of that decision
is not in order. The Court there placed heavy
emphasis upon the fact that use was made of a tenday summons, which made the time factor more
crucial. It should also be noted that the defendant
in that case brought a motion to quash the summons
prior to judgment. The alleged jurisdiction defect
was questioned at the earliest possible moment in
the proceedings. The authors of American Jurisprudence state the general rule concerning objections
to formal defects of service as follows:
*v
Formal defects and irregularities in process
.. - or the service thereof must be taken advantage
:* of at the first opportunity, and before any
further step in the cause is taken, otherwise
they will be held to have been waived . . .
62 Am, Jur.2d "Process" at 944 (1972).
Therefore, even if it were assumed arguendo that
there were defects in the service of sufficient magni-
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tude to destroy the lower court's jurisdiction, Defendant-Appellant waived the right to object to said
defects by waiting for over two full years and after
judgment was entered.

POINT II
THE SUMMONS WAS NOT DEFECTIVE NOR
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 78-27-27, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953).
Section 78-27-27 U.C.A. (1953), reads in part as
follows: "No default shall be entered [against a
nonresident] until the expiration of at least thirty
days after service. . . ." In the instant action default
was not entered for over two full years; therefore,
there was no violation of the statutory requirements.
The mere fact that the summons upon its face gave
20 days instead of 30 in which to answer does not
destroy the jurisdiction of the lower court.
The following quotation represents the majority
position:
It may be said . . . that in the majority of
the cases considering the fact that the return
day of process is mistakenly or defectively
stated, the rule seems to be that it does not
render the process void, but only voidable. 62
Am.lur. 2d "Process" at 797 (1972).
Defendant-Appellant could have made a special
appearance after he was personally served with sum9
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mons and complaint to render the irregularity voidable; however, as with the defects discussed under
Point I, he chose to do nothing. He should not be
allowed at this late date to destroy the court's jurisdiction.
Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 772,'48 N.W.2d 266
(1951), was a case in which the original notice served
upon defendant stated that defendant had only 20
days to appear, while the procedural rules called for
30 days. Defendant made a special appearance claiming that the notice was invalid, and the lower court
agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the defect was a mere irregularity and did not make
the service a nullity. After a fairly extensive review
of cases from other jurisdictions the Court stated:
The defendant was entitled to thirty days
to appear; but he was entitled to no more than
that.
"
_ _ _ The fact that the notice as served upon
':\"'Z defendant fixed 20 days, instead of 30 for his
appearance, does not change the rule. Ibid, at
- •

;

In 1969, the Oregon Supreme Court had before it
a case very similar to the present. In State ex rel.
Kalich v. Bryson, 253 Or. 418, 453 P.2d 659 (1969),
the defendants were personally served out of state.
The summons failed to designate the time in which
defendants were required to appear, although the
10
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process was correct in all other respects. The court
said cthat the critical issue was notice to the defendants. It held:
We do not think that the failure to give
[defendants] notice of the time in which to
appear or answer invaded any interest of
theirs worthy of protection to such an extent
that the court did not have ,|urisdiction %. „. .
Ibid, at 420.
The court stated that as long as the lower court's
refusal to quash summons did not deprive the defendants of legally protected rights, there was no reason
for the lower court to say that it was without jurisdiction.
As with the discussion under Point I, DefendantAppellant has waived his right to contest the irregularity of the number of days in which to respond. If
Defendant-Appellant had any real defenses to the
allegations of the complaint and had wished to complain of the defective summons, he should have
stepped forward prior to entry of judgment.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully concludes that
the lower court obtained personal jurisdiction over
Defendant-Appellant and that its decision should be

ft
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given full force and effect. Defendant-Appellant
failed to successfully rebut the allegations made by
Officer Keenoy regarding the service of process. Even
if the defects complained of by Defendant-Appellant
were sufficient to deprive him of substantial justice
and thus make the service defective, which they were
not, Defendant-Appellant has waived his right to
object to said defects by his failure to come forth
earlier in the proceedings.
Therefore, the lower court's ruling should be
upheld.

Respectfully submitted,
n , MM C= !
-;•'••••'• ; •'•'

GAYLE DEAN HUNT AND
MIKEL M . BOLEY
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Attorneys
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